what can we do politically to lower carbon emissions
Global climate change is a "massive commonage action problem." While changes in private beliefs (for example, energy conservation) can assistance reduce emissions, organization-level changes to the manner human societies utilise energy and natural resources are necessary to limit global warming to "safe" levels. Government policy is 1 important means of organization change — including laws, rules, regulations, standards, and incentives. But many climatic change policies, from the local level to the global level, founder on the lack of "political will" — the unwillingness or inability of regime officials to enact policies that volition reduce carbon pollution at the scale and speed required. Public will, especially as expressed through denizen activism, is an important influence on the policymaker process. Strong public demand increases the likelihood that governments volition prioritize climatic change activeness.
Public willrefers to a "social organisation'due south shared recognition of a detail problem and resolve to address the situation in a detail way through sustained collective action." Indicators of public volition can include public support for mitigation policies, contacting government officials, and pro-climate consumer behavior. Importantly, however, in that location is no single, homogenous "public" — there are many diverse "publics" within any guild.
Stiff public need increases the likelihood that governments will prioritize climatic change activeness.
One key fix of citizens is anissue public— a relatively small proportion of a population that is passionate about a specific event. Consequence publics are highly attentive to and seek out data well-nigh their issue, have relatively high levels of knowledge, have developed potent and stable attitudes, and are more probable than other citizens to take action on the issue. Some issue publics are diffuse, with few and weak connective ties between private members. Others are highly organized through social, institutional, or advocacy groups and networks, which tin can make them powerful political actors. One instance of the latter is the National Burglarize Association — an organized issue public of approximately iv to 5 million members (in a country of more than than 250 meg adults) who wield political clout far beyond their numbers on the bug they intendance about.Public willcan thus include at least 3 levels of citizen engagement: (1) general public support for an issue or policy, (2) an outcome public focused on that effect or policy, and (3) an organized upshot public mobilized to exert influence on policymakers. In turn, a mobilized effect public can include diverse groups, organized into a coordinated "advancement coalition" of partners working together to achieve a mutual goal.
Separately, at that place is always "express space available on the political or conclusion-making agenda, that is the continually evolving, cursory list of problems that command policy makers' attending at a given time." "Windows of Opportunity" theory says an event is "virtually likely to achieve the political agenda when three things occur at the same time: a problem is perceived as important and urgent by the public and elites [public will]; viable policy solutions are available; and political commitment to prefer a solution is high [political will]. When these 3 elements converge, a "policy window" opens during which significant change is possible. All 3 elements are necessary for policy modify, simply even and so, change is not inevitable. Advocates have to exist set up and able to take advantage of a policy window when it opens. Later it closes, simply incremental progress is likely until the side by side window opens.
Global Warming's Six Americas
Edifice public will for climate change action must start with an understanding of the unlike publics within a population. Since 2008, the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, in partnership with the George Mason University Center for Climatic change Communication, has conducted a twice-a-year nationally representative survey calledClimate Change in the American Heed. Ane key insight has been the identification of "Global Warming'southward 6 Americas" — six distinct segments of the American publican public that each respond to the issues in a dissimilar mode.
Equally of 2008, 21 percentage of Americans were alarmed nigh climate change. The Alarmed are convinced that global warming is happening, human-acquired, and an urgent threat, and they strongly support climate change action. Most, however, practise not know what they tin practice to solve the problem. Next are the Concerned (30 percent), who likewise think human-caused global warming is happening and is a serious threat. However, they believe that information technology is withal a distant problem — distant in fourth dimension, with impacts a generation or more away, and distant in space — a problem that volition primarily bear on plants, penguins, or polar bears simply not the United states, their communities, or the people and places they care about. The Concerned support policy activeness merely do not meet the consequence equally an urgent priority.
Next are the Cautious (21 percentage), who even so question: Is global warming happening? Is it homo-caused or natural? Is it serious or overblown? The Cautious take not yet made upward their minds. Then come up the Disengaged (7 pct), who know niggling about global warming. They rarely or never hear virtually it in the media or from their own friends or family members. Side by side are the Doubtful (12 per centum), who do not retrieve global warming is happening, merely if information technology is, information technology is simply a natural cycle. They do not retrieve well-nigh climate change much or consider it a serious gamble. The final group are the Dismissive (nine percent), who are convinced global warming is not happening, human-caused, or a threat. Virtually endorse conspiracy theories: global warming is a hoax, scientists are making up the data, or it is just a become-rich scheme past Al Gore. The Dismissive are but a pocket-sized percentage of the American public. But they are very vocal, and their views have had an outsize influence in Congress, the White House, and many country governments.
Engagement Strategies
A first priority is to organize the Alarmed, who are currently a latent result public. In that location ae approximately 53 million Americans alarmed about climate change. Of this group, seven percent (about 3.vii one thousand thousand) say they are already part of "a campaign to convince elected officials to accept action to reduce global warming." 28 per centum (about fourteen.eight million) say they "definitely would join" a campaign, and 37 per centum (about 19.vi meg) say they "probably would join" such a campaign. This represents an enormouspotentialsocial movement — if they were recruited, organized, and deployed. Only dissimilar other issue publics, the citizen activist wing of the climate movement remains relatively small and disorganized.
Second, the diverse organizations advocating for climate change action need to be organized into anadvancement coalitionwith the political muscle to sway elections, influence policymakers, and overcome the concerted opposition of climate modify activeness opponents. Advancement coalitions can include nongovernment organizations, social movements, governments, political parties, research institutions, companies, and media outlets. On the issue of climate change, opponents of climate change policy, such as the fossil fuel industry billionaires Charles Koch and David H. Koch, accept synthetic a larger, better organized, and better financed coalition, sustained over decades, than have proponents, who — despite having majority public support for many policies, a larger event public, and a larger number of organizations working on climate modify — continue to pursue relatively diverse agendas, with less coordination and focus. The balance of power and influence betwixt these different coalitions can have very significant effects on the policy-making process.
A third priority is to build the "silent permission" for action amidst the 70 per centum of Americans in the middle four groups of the Half-dozen Americas. These audiences are unlikely to become agile members of the climatic change issue public (for example, the Alarmed), simply critically, they do represent the bulk of voters. They are unlikely to ever lobby a public official, call their members of Congress, march in the streets, or donate money to a climatic change organization. But about elected officials demand their silent permission to pass climate policies — their tacit support and willingness to non punish political leaders at the election box for taking activity. A slightly more ambitious goal for this silent bulk is to persuade them to prefer political candidate X over candidate Y, considering candidate 10 favors stronger climate change activeness.
Climatic change threatens the life-support systems all homo beings, human societies, and other species depend on. This recognition has led to the emergence of various new voices also demanding action.
A fourth priority is to build adiverseissue public among the Alarmed. Many Americans currently associate climate change with three main messengers: scientists, environmentalists, and liberal politicians. For most Americans, however, these are relatively abstruse others. Near people trust scientists and hold them in high esteem; however, for most Americans, scientists remain a distant brainchild. Few Americans personally know a scientist, permit lone a climate scientist, and rarely place with science or scientists themselves. Likewise, many Americans practise not consider themselves "environmentalists," who are ofttimes stereotyped as "others," with different values, attitudes, and behaviors than mainstream Americans. Finally, most Americans do non identify as potent liberals. Besides, pre-existing political identities shape attitudes toward climate champions like one-time vice president Gore. Gore successfully engaged the liberal Democratic base and elites in the consequence of climate change, only he besides activated strong opposition from those Americans who dislike him and his politics — intensifying the partisan separate on climate change. All three of these messengers reinforce the perception for many Americans that climate change is "their" issue, not "my" issue. Most Americans have non nonetheless seen people like themselves enervating climatic change action.
Only climatic change threatens the life-support systems all human beings, human societies, and other species depend on. This recognition has led to the emergence of diverse new voices also enervating action, including business, faith, and military machine leaders, media organizations, artists, minority groups, doctors, lawyers, children, parents, grandparents, and every other sector of social club.
Information technology is critical to organize and amplify these new voices. Beyond their ain political, social, and cultural ability, their participation communicates to the silent majority that people other than scientists, environmentalists, and liberals care about climate change. Various Americans are starting to see and hear from people who look like them, dress similar them, talk like them, and share their values, who are at present saying climate change is "our" issue too. This mental shift — from perceiving climate change equally "their" issue to "our" and ultimately "my" issue — helps build public will for policy action. That public volition tin and then be mobilized when policy windows open at the local, state, national, or international levels.
Discussion
Engaged citizens, organized effect publics, and advocacy coalitions can build public and political will for climate change action. These groups will be vital to the achievement of stiff and sustained climate alter policies. While many organizations with professional staff abet for such policies, relatively few find, recruit, train, and deploy agile citizens equally a means of political power. Instead, many environmental groups focus on legal challenges, policy development, economic analysis, or professional person lobbying of elected officials. These are all critical functions of a robust climate movement, simply relatively few environmental or other groups focus on developing citizen activists. Citizen's Climate Lobby, the Sierra Social club'southward Beyond Coal campaign, 350.org, the Sunrise Movement, and some state and local-based organizations are a few examples of groups that accept made citizen organizing a core part of their DNA.
Building a powerful consequence public, with political muscle, requires a different kind of organization. It necessitates unlike strategies and tactics: taking advantage of xx-outset-century information-driven tools to find Alarmed citizens; connecting them to organizations devoted to developing and amplifying citizen voices and ability (non merely fund-raising or petition-signing), besides known as "deep organizing"; building a shared sense of collective efficacy through wins large and small; and investing in sustained ability building and then the movement is eady to act when policy windows open up.
Ultimately, advocates must shift the political climate of climate change. Climate change itself provides an analogy — as the planet warms, farthermost events get more frequent and severe. Similarly, every bit the climate movement shifts the political climate of climate change in a positive direction, the movement will win more frequently and the policy wins will go further and be less vulnerable to balloter swings. Equally the climate itself shifts in an always-more dangerous management, information technology will go ever more imperative that advocates build public and political volition — shifting the political climate toward more ambitious climatic change action.
This is an excerpt of an essay by Anthony Leiserowitz published in the book, "A Better Planet: 40 Big Ideas for a Sustainable Future." Leiserowitz is a senior research scientist at the Yale School of the Environment and manager of the Yale Program on Climate change Communication.
Source: https://environment.yale.edu/news/article/building-public-and-political-will-for-climate-change-action